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Abstract
This paper analyzes a synchronization game. Agents take part in an
activity and beneﬁt from the participation of others. Coordinated ac-
tions are fruit of correlated eﬀects as well as endogenous interactions.
Standard tools applied in optimal stopping problems for continuous
parameter stochastic processes are used but the processes under study
are endogenized by making their distribution dependent on the par-
ticipation of the group. Under certain conditions, this setup allows for
identiﬁability and separation of correlated and endogenous inﬂuences.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Social interactions that are not mediated through markets and their con-
sequences to the economic arena have commanded increasing consideration
from researchers in the recent past. Whereas economists have naturally paid
much more attention to social relations that can be incorporated by market
institutions, the existence of non-market interactions is nevertheless funda-
mental for the study of many issues in various ﬁelds of economics and the
accurate identiﬁcation and measurement of the types of interactions under-
lying these phenomena can be helpful in designing appropriate policies.
It is usually diﬃcult to disentangle why agents behave similarly when
they do so. Manski [31] labeled this as the “reﬂection problem” and catego-
rized the forces that generate similarities in group behavior into three main
types: endogenous, contextual (or exogenous) and correlated eﬀects. In order
to understand this taxonomy, Manski provides a concrete example. One can
enumerate many elements aﬀecting a child’s achievement in school. Aside
from those that are inherent to the individual we could cite 1. the perfor-
mance of his or her classmates, as well as 2. their socio-economic background
and maybe 3. the teacher or the infra-structure provided by the school itself.
The ﬁrst and second are inherently social eﬀects whereas the third arises
only because individuals are subject to the same institutional environment
or are very similar in their individual characteristics. For this reason the last
eﬀect is qualiﬁed by Manski as a “correlated eﬀect”. Although the ﬁrst two
factors are social eﬀects, they are distinct in nature. The ﬁrst eﬀect, that of
the group’s achievement on a student’s achievement, will typically generate
a feedback phenomenon: a student will have higher achievement when their
classmates have higher achievement and these on the other hand will also fol-
low the same prescription, creating a virtuous circle. This “bootstrap” eﬀect
will blow up the impact of other factors, generating a “social multiplier”,
and might even allow for multiple equilibria if strong enough (see, for in-
stance, Glaeser and Scheinkman [15]). In this case, parameter identiﬁability
2and estimation become even more problematic as pointed out in Bresnahan
and Reiss [5] but nonetheless feasible under certain circumstances as indi-
cated in Tamer [40] among others. Because of this feedback, the eﬀect that
the group’s actions (achievement) have on one’s action is classiﬁed as an en-
dogenous eﬀects. The remaining social eﬀects are labeled as contextual, or
exogenous, eﬀects.
It is important to distinguish these elements because they usually imply
very diﬀerent policy prescriptions. If exogenous eﬀects exist, for instance,
change of group membership is bound to have an impact in the outcomes.
On the other hand, the existence of endogenous inﬂuences would indicate
that application of the prescribed interventions only to a subset of the group
would likely be suﬃcient to aﬀect all the members. Even though it is impor-
tant to properly identify the nature of the social inﬂuence channel, this might
not be an easy task. As explained in Manski [31] the empirical problems
faced in this area are akin to the fact that the observation of equilibrium
prices and quantities is not enough to separate the market interactions of
consumers and suppliers (demand and supply curves). A simultaneity prob-
lem is latent and might hamper any attempts to pin down the nature of the
social environment under consideration. As a reaction, many studies have
been recently produced to advance techniques and illuminate the empirical
work on the ﬁeld. Areas in which statistical identiﬁcation of these phenomena
has been shown to be possible include, for instance, non-linear econometric
models and the econometric analysis of games.
In light of the above discussion, imagine an individual faced with the
decision of whether to join a certain welfare program or not. It has been
documented that a signiﬁcant portion of eligible candidates choose not to
take part in these programs. The participation rate in the Food Stamps
Program (FSP) among eligible individuals for example declined from 74% in
1994 to 59% in 1999 (The Decline in Food Stamps Participation: A Report to
3Congress, USA/FNS, 2001). Similar phenomena also take place in other pro-
grams such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which
replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
This behavior is usually ascribed to the existence of a stigma attached to
the decision of participation. Under these circumstances an interesting feed-
back phenomenon may be latent: communities of high participation would
induce lower stigmatization, which would itself favor increased participation,
whereas a group that starts out with a low level of participation would imply
h i g h e rs t i g m a ,w h i c hw o u l di nt u r nf a v o rl o wl e v e l so fp a r t i c i p a t i o n . S i n c e
the decision of whether to join a program is not a once-and-for-all choice, the
timing coordination is an important element in the analysis of this problem
and we can see basically as a synchronization problem. In this example, un-
doubtedly a relevant practical situation, as in other similar circumstances,
policy interventions that operate directly on this “bootstrap” channel may
be extremely eﬃcient.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper we develop a theoretical model captur-
ing this synchronization phenomenon while allowing for correlated as well as
endogenous eﬀects. The model describes the issue through optimal stopping
decisions in the presence of interactions (externalities). In Economics, stan-
dard optimal stopping problems arise naturally in investment models and in
ﬁnancial derivatives pricing (see for example Dixit and Pindyck [10]). The
general idea in these models is that a certain ﬂow of beneﬁts is described by
a stochastic process and the decision-maker is to devise a rule (i.e. stopping
time) in order to extract the maximum beneﬁt (i.e. maximize a certain gains
function in expected terms). The usual model assumes that the underlying
stochastic process is unaﬀected by the decision of the agents in the pop-
ulation under consideration. The modiﬁcation suggested incorporates the
possibility that the stopping decisions by a certain group of agents aﬀect the
evolution of the beneﬁt ﬂow and ultimately the decision of other individu-
als in the population contemplated. In other words, a stopping rule would
4typically be thought of as a “set of instructions” telling the decision maker
to quit the activity as soon as the state variable reaches a certain threshold
level. The diﬃculty in the problem analyzed is that the decision by other
community members will aﬀect the relevant state variable and aﬀect one
individual’s stopping rule formulation and the other community members’
decision rules are themselves endogenous to the problem. Circumstances
that are likely to be described by such a model involve all those that require
coordination on the timing of acts, such as the welfare program participation
example cited above. Others may include stock market participation (Hong,
Kubik and Stein [19] and Ivkovi´ c and Weibenner [21]), bank runs (Kelly
and Gr´ ada [25]), South-North migration (Orrenius [32]), marriage decisions
(Goldin and Katz [17]) and even crime recidivism (see, for instance, the em-
pirical investigation by Sirakaya [39] where social interactions are found to
meaningfully aﬀect recidivism among individuals on probation).
One particular application is the situation studied in a recent paper by
Costa and Kahn [8] (see also [9]). The purpose of the article is to investigate
the eﬀect of group homogeneity on shirking. In order to do so, the authors
use a dataset comprising detailed individual records for soldiers of the Union
Army in the American Civil War. The dataset allows Costa and Kahn to
build proxies for group homogeneity as well as to control for a series of other
potential determinants of “loyalty”, which is captured by events such as de-
sertion, arrest, AWOL (absence without leave) or promotion. In connection
with the model alluded above, the stopping decision here is represented by
the timing of each of these events, especially desertion. Using a standard
statistical duration model, the researchers ﬁnd that company homogeneity
indeed decreases shirking within groups. This might not seem very surprising
once one considers that a more homogeneous group facilitates communica-
tion and increases the chances of social sanction to those who shirk. On the
other hand, a more uniform environment might also facilitate coordination
among the agents involved and spark mass desertions, which seems to have
5been the case in other situations and especially among confederate soldiers
toward the end of the war (see, for instance, Bearman [4] and Lonn [27]).
Whereas standard statistical duration models could be employed to iden-
tify the existence of duration dependence among agents (as indeed is done in
Costa and Kahn [8] and Sikaraya [39] and suggested in Brock and Durlauf [6])
it is still unclear what is the source of such eﬀects: endogenous inﬂuences
or correlated unobservables. In contrast, our model clearly separates both
channels and lays out the circumstances under which each of these sources
is separately identiﬁable, thus presenting a substantial contribution to this
increasing ﬁeld. Furthermore, our model bears empirical consequences that
are not incorporated in the more standard econometric duration models such
as the positive probability of concomitant exits from the game and points to
the necessity of utilizing other metho d si ns u c he s t i m a t i o ne x e r c i s e s .
The next section presents a review of the relevant literature. A general
model is outlined in the following two sections and a specialization explored
in the subsequent one. Section 6 deals with the empirical implications and
the ﬁnal section concludes.
2L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w
To be added. Cite Mamer [29] and Lakari, Solan and Vieille [26]. Fudenberg
and Tirole [13], Ch.13 (diﬀerential and stochastic games, MPE). Literature
on game estimation.
3 The Model
Consider a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,P,(Ft)t∈R+) (the ﬁltration is as-
sumed to satisfy the usual conditions). Assume also that there are I agents
and that these agents take part in a certain activity (I will loosely use I
6to denote the set of agents and its cardinality). Each individual’s utility is
captured by a gain function (ui : R×R+ → R) evaluated at the value taken
by an individual state variable xi
t ∈ R+ and instant t ∈ R+ of a chosen stop-
ping point. An agent i ∈ I can choose to abandon the activity at any time
t ∈ R+ (where R+ =[ 0 ,∞]), so that the decision to stop can be represented
by τi, a (possibly inﬁnite) stopping time with respect to the individual ﬁl-
tration (Fi
t)t∈R+
1 representing agent i’s ﬂow of information. Throughout the
paper we will focus on the ﬁltration generated by his or her state variable
process and whether or not the other individuals have stopped. In other
words, Fi
t =[ ∨j6=iσ(t ∧ τj)] ∨ σ({xi
s :0≤ s ≤ t})( w i t hσA ∨ σB denoting
the σ-algebra generated by the union of the σ-algebras σA and σB). This
assures that each subject’s information relies only on each one’s individual
latent utility up to that particular point in time and the observation of the
others’ decisions instead of having knowledge of all the other agents’ state
variables evolution. I assume that the state variable evolves as a process
(adapted to the above ﬁltration) which may depend on the participation of
the remaining individuals in the group (thus the reference to externalities).
Let θi
t be the process representing the fraction of the population (exclud-




s=1,s6=i I{τs<t}/I (with I{A} as the indicator function for the event
A ⊂ Ω). This process will be determined endogenously as individuals choose
the stopping times in consonance with their preferences. Each individual
state variable xi




+ × [0,1] × R+ ×B (R+) → [0,1] is a kernel








1A random variable τ : Ω → R+ is a stopping time with respect to (Ft)t∈R+ if, for each
t ∈ R+, {ω : τ(ω) ≤ t} ∈ Ft. Some authors use the term Markov time for this deﬁnition
and refer to stopping times as ﬁnite Markov times. In this paper we use inﬁnite and ﬁnite
stopping times respectively for these objects. Intuitively they represent stopping strategies
that rely solely on past information.
7The superscript i reminds the reader that the state variable process may
diﬀer across individuals. The structure for the multi-person decision problem
is presented in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Stopping Game with Externalities) A Stopping Game
with Externalities is a tuple hI,(Ω,F,P,(Ft)t∈R+), (ui)i∈I,(xi)i∈I,(Ti)i∈Ii
where I is the set of agents; (Ω,F,P,(Ft)t∈R+),aﬁltered probability space;
ui : R×R+ → R, an individual gain (utility) function; xi, an individual pro-
c e s sa d a p t e dt ot h eﬁltration (Ft)t∈R+ and having as state space R+;a n dTi,
a set of stopping strategies τ : Ω → R+ such that {ω ∈ Ω : τ(ω) ≤ t} ∈ Fi
t,∀t
where Fi
t ⊂ Ft,∀i,t (i.e., τ is an (Fi
t)t∈R+ stopping time).
Having deﬁned the basic structure of the problem, the idea is that each
person i is confronted with a decision problem that is mathematically rep-
resented by the following (individual) optimal stopping problem (where τ




















tial condition given by xi. We assume that ui(x∞(ω),∞) = limsupt∈Z ui(xt(ω),t).
In this paper, the state variable is assumed to obey a transition law given





















t is a Wiener process deﬁned in the particular probability space we
are considering and the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients are assumed to be
positive Borel-measurable functions. The initial distribution Fi
0 is further-
more independent of the Brownian motion Wi
t. In order to assure that this
8stochastic diﬀerential equation has a strong solution given a proﬁle of stop-
ping times for each player, we impose the following assumptions on the drift
a n dd i s p e r s i o nc o e ﬃcients:
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz and Growth Conditions) The coeﬃcients


















s=1,s6=i I{τs<t}/I is adapted since θ is the aggregation of
indicator functions of events such as {τ <t },w h e r eτ i sas t o p p i n gt i m e .B y
Theorem I.1 in Protter [34], {τ <t } ∈ Ft. Given the Borel-measurability
conditions on the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients, this guarantees that, for
ﬁxed x,( t,ω) 7→ αi(x,θi
t(ω),t)a n dσi(x,θi
t(ω),t) are adapted. The above
assumptions guarantee the existence of a strong solution for the stochastic
diﬀerential equation (2). A sketch for the proof is presented in the Appendix.
The following section analyzes the existence of equilibria for this game.
4 Equilibrium: Existence
The solution concept we seek for this group situation is that of mutual best
responses, a standard Nash Equilibrium point: a collection of individual op-
timal stopping times indexed by the set I such that each individual stopping
time is optimal given the stopping rules adopted by the other agents. Denot-
ing by τ =( τi)i∈I a stopping time proﬁle, let Ui(τ)=Exi[ui(xτi,τi)] subject to
the above transition laws and initial conditions and evaluated at the strategy
proﬁle τ. We also adopt the convention of using τ−i as shorthand notation
for (τs)s∈I−{i}. A Nash Equilibrium 2 f o rt h ea b o v eg a m ei st h e n :
2Since the strategies depend on information generated by the state variables and these
are Markovian and since optimization follows Bellman’s principle of optimatility in dy-
9Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium) A Nash Equilibrium for the Stopping Game
with Externalities is a stopping time proﬁle τ∗ =( τ∗





In order to proceed with the analysis of equilibrium, we make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Exponential Discounting) Let ui(x,t)=e−γitgi(x),γi >
0,g i : R+ → R,∀i ∈ I We refer to gi(·) as the reward function.
Assumption 3 (Reward Function) The individual reward functions gi(·),
∀i ∈ I are assumed to satisfy:
• Monotonicity. gi(·) is increasing.
• Convexity. gi(·) is convex.
• E[supt∈Z |e−γitgi(xi
t)|] < ∞.
• Twice diﬀerentiability. gi(·) is twice diﬀerentiable.
• Bounded derivative. The derivative g0(·) is bounded.
Assumption 4 (Bounded volatility) For each t<∞ and feasible proﬁle







Assumption 5 (Complementarity) The drift and the dispersion coeﬃ-
cients are assumed to be decreasing on their second argument.
namic programming – whatever the initial state and decisions are, the remaining decisions
must be optimal with regard to the state resulting from the ﬁrst decision – these are also
Markov Perfect Equilibria. For a discussion of MPE, see Fundenberg and Tirole [13],
chapter 13.
10The Exponential Discounting Assumption (2) signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the ma-
nipulation and is fairly standard in the ﬁeld. The set of assumptions re-
garding the reward functions, (3), encompasses monotonicity and convexity,
which are not very controversial either; bounded range, which is employed
to assert the existence of a solution for the optimal stopping problem, and
technical assumptions that facilitate the application of existing results in the
comparison of solutions of stochastic diﬀerential equations. The Bounded
Volatility Assumption (4) will imply that changes in the proﬁle of stopping
decisions will aﬀect the objective function only through the drift of the dis-
counted gain function. Finally, the Complementarity Assumption (5) ex-
presses the idea that higher participation makes the activity more attractive
as well as increases the volatility of the returns. We are now ready to state
the following result 3:
Theorem 1 (Existence) Under Assumptions 1-5, the Stopping Game with
Externalities has a nonempty set of equilibrium points and this set possesses
a maximal element.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
Under such general conditions, very little can be said regarding unique-
ness and other properties of the model. In fact, unless more stringent condi-
tions are imposed on the information structure, the setup will admit multiple
equilibria, as will be delineated in the following section.
5T h e D e s e r t i o n G a m e
We will frame this particular special i z a t i o no ft h em o d e li nt e r m so ft h e
strategic situation present in Costa and Kahn’s dataset (see [8] and [9]):
that of military desertion. Consider initially the hypothetical army where
3Mamer [29] obtains existence of equilibria in a similar (but more restrictive) game in
discrete time through similar techniques.
11soldiers contemplate the possibility of desertion. We use a state variable
x (which is assumed to evolve according to a certain stochastic process) to
represent the latent utility a soldier derives from remaining in the front. At
desertion, he or she pays a cost C. Such individual has to devise a timing
rule dictating his or her desertion decision. Given a discount rate γ,t h e




One should expect that the stopping decision of a solder directly aﬀects the
decision of the other one. If no one deserts, the social sanctions attached to
desertion tend to be high; whereas if there is mass desertion, such sanctions
tend to be minimized as well as the eﬀectiveness of the military company.
Our strategy is to model such external eﬀects through a change in the drift
of the latent utility process, x.
*****
At an initial stage though consider the individual problem where the state






t + σWt +l o gx0 if t<ν
(α − ∆α)(t − ν)+αν − σ2
2 t + σWt +l o gx0 if t ≥ ν
where ∆α > 0a n dν is an Ft-stopping time (assume, as usual, a ﬁltered
probability space (Ω,P,F,(Ft)t∈R+)). The initial condition is drawn from an
independent distribution F0 as in equation (2). Notice that the break point
for the drift here is exogenously given. At a later stage we will endogenize
this stopping time. For there to be a well-deﬁned solution to this problem,
we assume that γ > α.
Let x be the process corresponding to ν(ω)=∞,∀ω ∈ Ω (i.e. a ge-
o m e t r i cB r o w n i a nm o t i o nw i t hd r i f ta n dd i ﬀusion coeﬃcients αx and σx)
and x be the process corresponding to ν(ω)=0 ,∀ω ∈ Ω (i.e. a geometric
12Brownian motion with drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients (α − ∆α)x and σx).
By standard dynamic programming calculations, the optimal stopping times
for these two processes are characterized by threshold levels z = z(α,σ,C,γ)











+2 γ/σ2 > 1
(see Dixit and Pindyck [10], p.140-144). For notational convenience, we omit
the parameter dependence in the remainder of the section. Given an arbitrary
ν we propose the stopping rule characterized by the following continuation
region:
{x ≤ z} if t<ν
{x ≤ z} if t ≥ ν
(5)
If we let τ ≡ inft{t : xt ≥ z} and τ ≡ inft{t : xt ≥ z}, the stopping time
associated with this region is
τ = τIτ≤ν +i n f {t>ν : xt > z}Iτ>ν
where IA is the indicator function for the event A. 4 We are then ready to
state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The continuation region (5) deﬁnes an optimal stopping time
for the stated problem.
4To see that τ is indeed an Ft-stopping time, notice that τ,ν being stopping times
implies that τ ∧ ν is also a stopping time (see Karatzas and Shreve [23], Lemma I.2.9).
This in turn implies that {ν ∧ τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft ⇔ ({τ ≤ ν} ∩ {τ ≤ t}) ∪ ({ν < τ} ∩ {ν ≤
t}) ∈ Ft,∀t. On the other hand, Fν ⊂ Fν+τ by Lemma I.2.15 in Karatzas and Shreve
[23]. This means that (A ∩ {ν ≤ t} ∈ Ft ⇒ A ∩ {ν + τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft). Then, from above,
({τ ≤ ν}∩{τ ≤ t})∪({ν < τ}∩{ν+τ ≤ t}) ∈ Ft,∀t.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o{τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft,∀t
which establishes that τ is a stopping time.
13Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
The optimal stopping time is thus given by
τ = τIτ≤ν +i n f {t>ν : xt > z}Iτ>ν




−γτ(xτ − I)Iτ≤ν + e
−γinf{t>ν:xt>z}(xinf{t>ν:xt>z} − I)Iτ>ν]
The above proposition can easily be extended to processes with multiple
breaks at increasing stopping times (as we do later on) and delivers a stopping
rule where the agent switches progressively to lower threshold levels as the
drift breaks take place.
*****
Now consider a hypothetical army with two soldiers indexed by i =1 ,2.
They both contemplate a desertion decision that will cost them Ii,i=1 ,2i n
return for a value xi,i=1 ,2, just as in the previous setup. The diﬀerence is
that the latent utility process for one soldier is negatively aﬀected once the
other soldier decides to leave the front.
In particular, consider all the above parameters indexed by i and the









t +l o gxi
0 if t<τj
(αi − ∆αi)(t − τj)+αiτj − σi2
2 t + σiWi
t +l o gxi
0 if t ≥ τj
where i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j and τj is the stopping time adopted by the other sol-
dier in the game. Notice that the dependence between the Brownian motions
is left unconstrained and that ∆αi measures the external eﬀect of the other
agent’s decision on i. This reveals the two major aspects of group behavior
under consideration in this study: correlated and endogenous social eﬀects.
Individuals might behave similarly in response to associated (unobservable)
14shocks, which are reﬂected in the possibly non-null cross-variation of the
Brownian motions driving individual latent utilities. These are correlated
eﬀects. On the other hand, agents may directly aﬀected by other agents’
actions as well and this would appear as a decrease in the implicit utility
of a soldier for remaining in the front after another soldier leaves the army.
This is the endogenous eﬀe c t . W ea s s u m et h a te a c hp l a y e ro n l yk n o w st h e
evolution of his or her own latent utility process and the timing of previous
desertions. In other words, Fi
t =[ ∨j6=iσ(t ∧ τj)] ∨ σ({xi
s :0≤ s ≤ t}),∀t,i.
The previous analysis establishes that each soldier will use the “high
drift” optimal stopping rule characterized by the threshold zi until the stop-
ping time τj, at which she switches to the “low drift” stopping rule, char-
acterized by the threshold zi. In this case though we need to handle the
fact that τj is not exogenously given, but determined within the strategic
situation at hand. It is illustrative to portray this interaction graphically.
Consider the X1×X2 space where the evolution of the vector-valued pro-
cess (x1,x 2) is represented. Since ∆αi > 0, we should have zi >z i,i=1 ,2.
As in the previous analysis, soldiers start out under threshold zi.I f t h e
other soldier stops, the threshold level drops to zi. For instance, in Figure 1
the process ﬂuctuates in rectangle (0,z1)×(0,z2) and reaches the barrier z1
causing soldier 1 to stop. Once this happens, soldier 2’s threshold drops to
z2, which, once reached, provokes soldier 2 to stop. A symmetric situation
occurs if we interchange the soldiers roles.
A more interesting situation is depicted in Figure 2. Here, the vector
process sample path attains the upper threshold for soldier 1 at a point
where x2 ≥ z2. The second soldier’s threshold moves down immediately and
both stop simultaneously. So, if a soldier’s latent utility process is above the
subsequently lower threshold when the other one drops out, there will be
clustering and they move out concomitantly.
15If agents are allowed to base their rules on “enough” data, much leverage
is gained and multiple equilibria are possible. For the sake of illustration,
assume that Fi
t = Ft,∀i and t. In this case, it is licit for soldier 1 to follow a
stopping rule that dictates stopping once the process reaches the diagonal line
joining (z1,z2)a n d( z1,z2) (both soldier observe the two latent processes).
As shown in Figure 3, as soon as the process reaches this barrier soldier 2’s
threshold moves and leaves him or her in the stopping region, causing this
soldier to stop as well. If we use the same barrier though to characterize sol-
dier 2’s stopping rule and observe soldier 1’s response to it, we also get the
same result. This curve then characterizes an equilibrium for this game. But
there is indeed nothing special about this curve and we could have used any
o t h e rs h a p ei nt h es q u a r e( z1,z1) × (z2,z2) connecting the NW and SE cor-
ners. This rectangle supports multiple equilibria. The following proposition
states the equilibrium for this situation:
Proposition 2 Assume Fi





∃i such that xi ≥ zi; or
(x1,x 2): x2 ≥ f(x1) where x1 ∈ (z1,z1),f(·) is continuous,




and let τS =i n f {t>0:( x1
t,x 2
t) ∈ S} denote the hitting time for this set.








Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
The area of the rectangle with vertices in {(x1,x 2):xi = zi or xi = zi,i=
1,2} could be seen as a “measure of multiplicity” in the model. Notic-
ing that ∂(zi − zi)/∂· =
R
(∂2zi/∂α∂·)dα, it can be seen that the area
of this rectangle varies positively with the intensity of the external eﬀects
∆αi = αi − αi,i =1 ,2, and the uncertainty in the latent utility process
16σi,i=1 ,2 .S o ,a sl o n ga st h e r ea r ee x t e r n a le ﬀects (∆αi > 0,i=1 ,2), there
will be multiple equilibria in this game.
Is multiplicity a reasonable outcome? The achievement of multiple equi-
libria seems to require a (very fragile) omniscience by the players involved.
If one restricts the information set accessible by each soldier to his or her
own state variable, the result breaks down and uniqueness is achieved. Since
at each moment an individual is unable to pinpoint the exact location of the
other player’s state variable and this will, with positive probability, lie below
the lower stopping threshold, an “early” stopping decision may not elicit de-
sertion by the other player and risk sacriﬁcing potentially proﬁtable expected
rewards by staying put in the game. In the proposition below we restrict each
agents information set to his or her own state variable and whether or not
the other agent has stopped5.
Proposition 3 Assume Fi
t =[ ∨j6=iσ(t∧τj)]∨σ({xi
s :0≤ s ≤ t}),∀t,i.L e t
S = {(x
1,x
2):∃i such that x
i ≥ z
i}
and let τS =i n f {t>0:( x1
t,x 2
t) ∈ S} denote the hitting time for this set. The









Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
Even if access to more data is allowed, epistemological frictions may
be seen to render uniqueness. If for instance one reasonably assumes that
the other agent’s desertion and state variable are perceived with delay by
a soldier, dropping out may not elicit the other player’s desertion as in the
5Notice that the ﬁltration is itself endogenously generated since the stopping times are
decision variables.
17previous situation. This “synchronization risk” is inherent in many similar
situations as the following quote in one of the earliest discussions of this
problem asserts:
It is usually the essence of mob formation that the potential mem-
bers have to know not only where and when to meet but just when
to act so that they act in concert. (...) In this case the mob’s
problem is to act in unison without overt leadership, to ﬁnd some
common signal that makes everyone conﬁdent that, if he acts on
it, he’ll not be acting alone. (Schelling [37])
For this reason we restrict our attention to the above equilibrium which is
robust to such perturbations.
*****
We now generalize the analysis for a military company comprising I soldiers.
As in the previous case, we begin by extending the analysis for a situation
with multiple (random) breaks in the drift coeﬃcient.
Proposition 4 Let logxt = αt − ∆α
Pn
k=1(t − νk)It≥νk − σ2
2 t + σWt where
∆α,α,σ > 0,t∈ R+,n∈ I,W is a standard Brownian motion and {νk}k=1,...,n
is an increasing sequence of stopping times. The optimal continuation region
for the stopping problem is given by
{x ≤ zk−1} if t<νk,k=1 ,...,n
{x ≤ zn} if t ≥ νn
where zk is the threshold level associated to the problem with logxt =( α −
k∆α)t + σWt.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
*****
18As before, a desertion decision is assumed to cost a soldier Ci,i ∈ I in















where τj is the stopping time adopted by the soldier j.N o t i c et h a tt h ee x -
ternal eﬀect of other soldiers on i is given by ∆αi > 0 and is considered to be
homogeneous across soldiers, i.e. the amount by which the drift αi decreases
with each stopping decision is the same regardless of who deserts.
In order to generalize Proposition 2, a few deﬁnitions are convenient.
zi
m : z(αi − ∆αi(m−1
I−1 ),σi,Ci,γi)w h e r ei,m ∈ I
Sm : {(x1,x 2,...,x I) ∈ RI
+ : ∃i such that xi ≥ zi
m}where m ∈ I
τ0 :0 ( m e a n i n g τ0(ω)=0 ,∀ω)
A0 : II (identity matrix of order I)
τm :i n f {t>τm−1 : Am−1xt ∈ Am−1SI+1−10Am−11} where Am−1SI+1−10Am−11
denotes the set formed by operating the matrix Am−1 on each





m if k = l = i and am
kl =0o t h e r w i s ea n d
m ∈ I
An inequality sign relating two vectors is understood as a relation that holds
component by component. The stopping times deﬁned above are essentially
hitting times.
The idea is that the military company starts out with no defection and
desertions occur at the random times τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ τ3 ....O u ri n t e r e s ta tﬁrst
is on the hitting time for the set S1, which is a generalization for the two
dimensional S in Proposition 2. As the vector process reaches this set, one
or more agents will quit. This will shift the stopping threshold S·.I no r d e r
to do so, we need to take into account the soldiers that have defected. This
is done by use of the matrices A·. Defections will occur at stopping times
19τ· and 10A·1 basically records the number of agents that have not stopped
after that stage. This goes on until all agents have stopped. The following
proposition summarizes this intuition:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium strategies for the desertion game with I sol-













Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
In the next section, we initiate the discussion on the econometrics of this
model.
6 Empirical Implications
This section analyzes the empirical content of the model. We remind the
reader that by endogenous eﬀects we mean the eﬀect of other agents’ par-
ticipation (represented in the model by θt) on the transition law for the
individual state variables. More speciﬁcally we say that there are endoge-
nous eﬀects when the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients in equation (2) are
aﬀected by θt. Correlated eﬀects refer to the possible association among the
Brownian motions that drive each individual’s latent utility process.

















t +l o gx
i
0,i ∈ I
where τj is the stopping time adopted by the soldier j. The cross-variation
process for the Brownian motions is given by hWi,Wjit = ρt,i 6= j and the
initial condition x0 =( xi
0)i∈I follows a probability law Fi
0. The individual
20initial drift coeﬃcient is potentially a function of an l-dimensional vector of
individual covariates wi(1×l) which is independent of the Brownian motion.
Let Fw denote the distribution of w =( wi)i∈I. For simplicity, assume that
α
i = α(wi)=e x p ( β
0wi).
In beneﬁt of readability we suppress the argument and denote the drift by
αi. In what follows all the statements are conditional on w =( wi)i∈I.T h e
parameter ∆α measures the external eﬀect of the other agents decision on
i and introduces endogenous social eﬀects and ρ represents correlated social
eﬀects. In addition to the above parameters, each agent pays a cost C to
leave and discounts the future at the exponential rate γ.L e t ’ s d e n o t e b y
zi = z(αi,σ,γ,C),i∈ I the upper threshold for each agent.
If there are no social interactions or correlated eﬀects (∆α =0a n d
ρ = 0), the individual Brownian motions are independent and each agent’s
latent utility evolves as a geometric Brownian motion with drift αi,d i ﬀusion
coeﬃcient σ and initial position xi. As a consequence the desertion times τ∗
i
are independent inverse Gaussian random variables 6.B e l o wa r es o m eo ft h e






































6The Inverse Gaussian is the distribution of the hitting time of a Brownian motion
on a given barrier logz. In our case, the initial position is logxi; the drift coeﬃcient,
αi − σ2/2a n dt h ed i ﬀusion coeﬃcient, σ. For an economic application of the Inverse
Gaussian distribution, see Lancaster [28]. Chhikara and Folks [7] provide an extensive
characterization of this distribution.
21with
β(α






+2 γ/σ2 > 1.
All the moments of this distribution are functions of E[t]a n dE[t−1]( s e e
Chhikara and Folks [7]). Furthermore, the sample mean and harmonic mean
are suﬃcient statistics and MLE estimators for the distributional parameters
above.
We are now in shape to start looking at the outcomes in the presence
of interactions and correlated eﬀects. The next proposition states that si-
multaneous desertions only occurs in the presence of endogenous eﬀects.
Proposition 6 P[τi = τj,i6= j,i,j ∈ I] > 0 if and only if there are endoge-
nous eﬀects.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
This is a desirable feature of the model since it seems to hold in the Union
Army data, whereas traditional econometric models in duration analysis typ-
ically do not generate clustering in timing – the probability of simultaneous
exit is zero. The result relies basically on the continuity of the sample paths
for the stipulated process. If discontinuities are allowed, this would not hold
any longer7. What events could possibly provoke discontinuities in the latent
utility process? In the military example that motivates this exercise, one
could think of the advent of battles, for instance. But the problem would be
diluted if one knows the timing of such shocks. If one observes clustering in
other moments, this is evidence in favor of endogenous eﬀects. As a matter
of fact the timing of the battles fought by each individual in the Civil War
data is known and could be controlled for.
7One way to introduce such discontinuities is to insert an exogenous jump component
dQi in equation (2).
22Another implication of the model is that the game size, or the military
company size, in our case, does aﬀect outcomes. This is stated in the next
proposition.
Proposition 7 The size of the game I aﬀects the equilibrium if and only if
there are endogenous eﬀects.
Proof. In preparation.
We present below a ﬁrst characterization for the probability distribu-
tion of observable outcomes. If we represent by G(t,x) the probability that
the players will abandon the activity after time t when the vector of initial
conditions is given by x, the following result then holds:
Proposition 8 Let G(t,x)=P[τ∗
i >t ,i∈ I|x0 = x]. Then G is the unique
solution to
∂G/∂t = A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)G in Sc,t>0
G(0,x)=1 ,x ∈ Sc
G(t,x)=0 ,x ∈ ∂S and t ≥ 0
where S = S((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C)={x ∈ RI





























is the inﬁnitesimal generator for the I-dimensional diﬀusion representing the
latent utility vector process with killing time at τS : {xt : t ≤ τS}.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
In the same fashion, one can obtain an expression for the probability
that the agents will abandon the game after time t and there is simul-
taneous exit given an initial condition x. W ed e n o t et h i sp r o b a b i l i t yb y
23H(t,x)=P[τ∗
i >t ,i∈ I and τS ∈ ∂S1|x0 = x]( w h e r e∂S1 is deﬁned below).
The following characterization follows:
Proposition 9 Let H(t,x)=P[τ∗
i >t ,i∈ I and τS ∈ ∂SH|x0 = x]. Then
H is the unique solution to
∂H/∂t = A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)H in Sc,t>0
H(0,x)=u(x),x ∈ Sc
H(t,x)=0 ,x ∈ ∂S and t ≥ 0
with
A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)u =0in Sc
u(x)=1 ,x ∈ ∂SH
u(x)=0 ,x ∈ ∂S\∂SH
where S = S((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C)={x ∈ RI
+ : ∃i such that xi ≥ z(αi,σ,γ,C)},





























is the inﬁnitesimal generator for the I-dimensional diﬀusion representing the
latent utility vector process with killing time at τS : {xt : t ≤ τS}.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
One question that arises naturally is the possibility of disentangling cor-
related and endogenous eﬀects in the data. The econometrician presumably
observes the equilibrium exit strategies (τ∗
1,...,τ∗
I) for a certain number of re-
alizations of the game and would be interested in knowing what parameters of
t h em o d e lc a nb er e t r i e v e dg i v e nd a t ao nt h es i t u a t i o nu n d e ra n a l y s i s .C o u l d
two diﬀerent parameter vectors generate the same distribution for the data?
This is the typical problem of statistical identiﬁcation of a parameter vector.
Similar problems arise in natural sciences, where a researcher is confronted
24with a distribution of exit times and is interested in reconstructing aspects
of an unobserved stochastic process (see, for instance, Bal and Chou [3] for
related problems in chemical and neurological studies). Following Hsiao [20]
(see also Manski [30]), we deﬁne the parameters in a model to be identiﬁed
if two diﬀerent parametric speciﬁcations are not observationally equivalent.
Letting τ denote some outcome variables observed by the researcher, w some
observable covariates and ψ a parameter (of arbitrary ﬁnite dimension) lying
in a certain set Ψ and governing the probability distribution P(·|w;ψ)o ft h e
outcome variables, the following deﬁnes identiﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 3 (Identiﬁcation) The parameter ψ ∈ Ψ is identiﬁed relative
to ˆ ψ if (ˆ ψ / ∈ Ψ) or (P(·|w;ψ)=P(·|w; ˆ ψ),F w-a.e. ⇒ ψ = ˆ ψ).
We say that ψ is globally identiﬁed if it is identiﬁed relative to any pa-
rameter vector in the parameter space and that it is locally identiﬁed if it is
identiﬁed relative to any parameter vector in a neighborhood of ψ.I nw h a t
follows we analyze the identiﬁcation for the desertion model. Let g(t;ψ,w)
denote the probability density function for the ﬁrst desertion time under
the parameters ψ =( x,β,σ,ρ,γ,C) and conditioned on the observable co-
variates w. The following statement establishes suﬃcient conditions for the
identiﬁcation of ψ.
Theorem 2 Let w be a set of continuous random covariates and, for some







g(t;ψ,w)dt 6=0 ( 6 )
then ψ is identiﬁed relative to ˆ ψ.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
In order to check condition (6) one should obtain g from the solution to
25the partial diﬀerential equation in Proposition 8 8. In certain special cases
this solution may be available analytically. This is so for instance if I =2 ,
in which case Theorem 3.5.2 in Rebholz [35] delivers (see alternatively He,
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1 +2 ρa1a2 + a2
2) − (α1 − σ2/2)a1 − (α2 − σ2/2)a2




with zi ≡ z(αi,σ,C,γ). Iyengar [22], which also derives an expression for the
above function, hints that the above is also generalizable for higher dimen-
sions in our speciﬁcs i t u a t i o n .
The following statement provides an alternative identiﬁcation result for
the main parameters in our model under the assumption that the initial
condition is observed and can be controlled for.
8This PDF can be obtained as −dG(·)/dt where G(·) is the solution to the PDE in
Proposition 8.
26Theorem 3 Assume that the initial condition is observed, its probability dis-
tribution F0 has support with non-empty interior and I>2.T h ep a r a m e t e r
vector ((αi)i∈I,∆α,ρ,σ,γ,C) is then identiﬁed.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
The key to this result is to notice that, whereas the existence of endoge-
nous eﬀects has no impact before the exit of the ﬁrst player, the correlation
coeﬃcient ρ and drift level αi do aﬀect the timing of the ﬁrst dropout. Given
the nonlinear character of the model, these two parameters can be identiﬁed
by the exit distribution of the ﬁrst deserter. The impact of the endogenous
eﬀect parameter on the probability of clustering of agents on the other hand
helps identify ∆α.
The statement rests on the assumption that observer can condition on x0,
the initial latent utility level. One could imagine the stock market partici-
pation application mentioned in the introduction with the latent utility level
representing some measure of relative portfolio performance among the play-
ers in a certain reference group. In this case one could conceive of datasets
recording initial stock allocations and entry and exit decisions but not interim
portfolios and apply the above result. In other applications though, where
the state variables xi stand for some subjective measure of satisfaction, this
assumption loses much of its appeal.
Notwithstanding the diﬃculties attached to the solution of the partial
diﬀerential equation in Proposition 8, a few cases allow some investigation.
We ﬁnish the section with a few remarks about the case of two agents.
1. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the time of ﬁrst deser-
tion is given by Theorem 3.5.2 in Rebholz [35] – expression (7).
Remark 1: If there are no endogenous eﬀects (∆α = 0) each desertion
time follows a univariate inverse gaussian which is (potentially) corre-
lated across soldiers in a given company. Expression (7) then gives the
27following probability: P(τ1 ≥ t,τ2 ≥ t).
Remark 2: If there are no correlated eﬀects, the expression (7) re-
duces to (1 − IG(t;x1,z1,α1,σ))(1 − IG(t;x2,z2,α2,σ)) where IG is
the CDF for the Inverse Gaussian distribution given in the opening
paragraphs of this section.
2. From Theorem 2.2(iii) in He, Keierstead and Rebholz [18] one obtains
an expression for P(x1(t) ∈ dx1,x 2(t) ∈ dx2,τS ≥ t)=P(x1,x 2,t).
Since (x1(t),x 2(t)) ∈ ∂S1 ⇒ τS ≤ t, one obtains that the probability








3. Accordingly, one can deduce that the PDF for agent 2’s exit at s and








where t>sand q is the PDF for the Inverse Gaussian given previously.
7D i s c u s s i o n
This paper analyzes a synchronization game which allows for endogenous and
correlated eﬀects among players. Agents participate in an activity and ben-
eﬁt from the participation of others. If the group leaves en masse,a na g e n t
will be more likely to depart; whereas if the agents stay, an individual will be
inclined to stay. Standard tools of optimal stopping problems for continuous
parameter stochastic processes are used but the processes are endogenized
by making their distribution dependent on the participation of the group.
This is a problem of great importance in many settings. Social welfare
28program participation, bank runs, South-North migration, marriage and di-
vorce decisions are only a few of the possibilities. Disentangling endogenous
and correlated eﬀects is thus fundamental not only to illuminate economic
research but also to enlighten policy. The setup delineated in this paper
allows us to separately identify the endogenous and correlated eﬀects asso-
ciated with each individual’s decision. Whereas this problem is unfeasible
in simpler settings (see Manski [31]), the separation is not clear in other
approaches that deal with similar situations (as in Brock and Durlauf [6]).
Empirical consequences that are not present in conventional methods of es-
timation are also obtained and point to the application of richer estimation
schemes in the analysis of these phenomena.
29Appendix
Sketch of Proof for Existence of a Strong Solution
The proof that there exists a strong solution for equation 2 follows from a
slight modiﬁcation of the proof provided in Karatzas and Shreve [23], p.289.
The key is to note that the iterative construction of a solution follows through
if we replace b(s,x)a n dσ(s,x)b yb(s,x,ω)a n dσ(s,x,ω) in the deﬁnition
of X(k).I f ,f o rﬁxed x,( s,ω) 7→ b(s,x,ω)a n d( s,ω) 7→ σ(s,x,ω) are adapted
processes, the resulting process is still adapted. The remainder of the proof
is identical. (See also Protter [34], Theorem V.7)
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
Consider a player i ∈ I. Let the stopping strategies for I − {i} be given by
the following proﬁle of stopping times τ−i =( τs)s∈I−{i}. Given Assumption
3, according to Theorem 4 in Fakeev [12], there exists a solution for the
optimal stopping time. Let the individual i’s best response function bi(·)
map a stopping time proﬁle τ−i onto one such optimal stopping solution.
Given this, consider b(·)d e ﬁned as the following mapping τ =( τs)s∈I 7→
b(τ)=( bi(τ−i))i∈I. A Nash Equilibrium is then simply a ﬁxed point for the
mapping b(·). In order to establish the existence of such a result we use the
Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem, reproduced below from Aliprantis and
Border [1], p.6:
Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem:L e t( X,≥)b eap a r -
tially ordered set with the property that every chain in X has a
supremum. Let f : X → X be increasing, and assume that there
exists some a in X such that a ≤ f(a). Then the set of ﬁxed
points of f is nonempty and has a maximal ﬁxed point.
In the following discussion we consider the set of stopping time proﬁles
and identify two stopping times that are P-almost everywhere identical. We
30proceed by steps:
Step 1: (Partial order) The set of stopping times endowed with the re-
lation ≥ deﬁned as: τ ≥ υ if and only if P(τ(ω) ≥ γ(ω)) = 1 is partially
ordered. In other words, ≥ is reﬂexive, transitive and anti-symmetric.
Step 2: (Every chain has a supremum) Given a set of stopping times T,
we should be able to ﬁnd a stopping time τ such that 1. τ ≥ τ,∀τ ∈ T,P-a.s.
and 2. if υ ≥ τ,P-a.s., τ ∈ T then υ ≥ τ,P-a.s.. If T is countable supτ∈T τ
is a stopping time and satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2 (see Karatzas and Shreve,
Lemma 1.2.11). If not, ﬁrst notice that, since the only structure that mat-
ters for this property is the ordering in R+, we can always assume that the
stopping times take values on [0,1] (otherwise, pick an increasing mapping
from R+ onto [0,1]). Let C be the collection of all countable subsets C ⊂ T.
For each such C,d e ﬁne:
lC =s u p
τ∈C
τ and v =s u p
C∈C
E(lC) < ∞
By the previous reasoning, lC is a stopping time. Then, there is a sequence
{Cn}n ⊂ C such that v = limn→∞ E(lCn). Now deﬁne C = ∪∞
n=1Cn ∈ C.T o
show that lC satisﬁes condition 1., ﬁrst notice that C ∈ C,v ≥ E(lC). On
the other hand, since Cn ⊂ C, E(lC) ≥ E(lCn) →n v.T h e s et w oi m p l yt h a t
v = E(lC).
For an arbitrary τ ∈ T,s e tCτ = {τ} ∪ C ∈ C.N o w , lCτ ≥ lC.T h i s
renders v ≥ E(lCτ) ≥ E(lC)=v ⇒ E(lCτ − lC)=0⇒ lCτ = lC,P-a.s. This
and lCτ ≥ τ,P- a . s .i nt u r ni m p l yt h a tlC ≥ τ,P-a.s.
To see that 2. is satisﬁed, notice that, if υ ≥ τ,∀τ ∈ T, in particular,
υ ≥ τ,∀τ ∈ C.T h i si m p l i e st h a tυ ≥ supτ∈C τ = lC.
Step 3:( ∃a such that a ≤ f(a)) Pick a as the proﬁle of stopping times
31that are identically zero.
Step 4:( b(·) is increasing) This is the case if each individual best response
function bi(·) is increasing. By the version of Itˆ o’s Lemma for twice diﬀeren-
tiable functions (see Revuz and Yor [36], p.224, remark 3), and the fact that
ui(x,t)=e−γitgi(x)i st w i c ed i ﬀerentiable (since gi(·)i st w i c ed i ﬀerentiable),
e−γitgi(x) obeys the following stochastic diﬀerential equation (given a proﬁle












































where the α(·,·,·)a n dβ(·,·,·) denote the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients of
e−γitgi(xi
t). If gi(·) is increasing and convex and if αi(·,·,·)a n dσi(·,·,·)a r e
decreasing in θ, the above drift is decreasing in θ.
Now consider a proﬁle of stopping times τ−i and υ−i such that τ−i domi-
nates υ−i,P- a.s. Moving from one proﬁle to another will impact θ and this
will have eﬀects on both the drift and the dispersion coeﬃcients of e−γitgi(xi
t).
The eﬀect on the dispersion coeﬃcient does not aﬀect the objective func-
tion of an individual agent. This obtains from the fact that g0(·)i sb o u n d e d






















s]=0 ,∀τ where τ is an
(Ft)-stopping time (see Karatzas and Shreve [23], p.19).









t aggregate the stopping decisions for the proﬁles τ−i and υ−i)w e
will have α(x,θ
i,υ
t ,t) ≤ α(x,θ
i,τ









































t ,∀0 ≤ t<∞]=1
Again, a slight variation of the proof of this proposition can be repeated




















s ) ≥ 0,∀0 ≤ s ≤ t<∞]=1
This suﬃces to show that it is not proﬁtable for agent i to stop earlier when
the proﬁle is τ−i than when the proﬁle is υ−i. Suppose not. Then, let A =
{bi(τ−i) <b i(υ−i)}. According to Lemma 1.2.16 in Karatzas and Shreve [23],









bi(τ−i)]}. The RHS expression in this inequality is
positive because A ∈ Fbi(τ−i)∩Fbi(υ−i) = Fbi(τ−i)∧bi(υ−i) which implies that the
agent would do better by picking bi(τ−i) ∧ bi(υ−i) if the RHS were negative.
But this would contradict the fact that bi(υ−i) is a best response. So, if
33A 6= Ø, delaying the response by choosing bi(υ−i)∨bi(τ−i) would improve the
agent’s payoﬀ given that the remaining agents are playing τ−i.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
A comparison result such as the one in Karatzas and Shreve [23], Proposition
V.2.18, or Protter [34], Theorem V.54, may be established to show that:
e
−γt(xt − I) ≤ e
−γt(xt − I),∀t P-a.s.
This in turn implies that
e
−γτ(ω)(x(ω)τ(ω) − I) ≤ e
−γτ(ω)(x(ω)τ(ω) − I), P-a.s.
The same comparison result can also be used to show that, on {ω ∈ Ω :
τ(ω) ≤ ν(ω)},w ei n d e e dh a v e
e
−γτ(ω)(x(ω)τ(ω) − I)=e
−γτ(ω)(x(ω)τ(ω) − I), P-a.s.
So, we can do no better than to use τ on the set {τ ≤ ν}.
On the complementary set, {τ ≥ ν}, think of the process logyt =l o gxν+t,t∈
R+. Using the fact that the process satisﬁes the Strong Markov Property,
this process is given by
logyt =( α − ∆α)t + σ ˜ Wt +l o gy0
where ˜ Wt = Wt+ν and y0 = xν. In other words, the process starts “afresh”
at ν with initial value given by xν and obeying the stochastic process with
low drift. As ascertained before, the optimal stopping time for this process is
inf{t>ν : xi




34P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Set ν = τ∗








τS = zi ⇒ τi = τS
When the vector process hits S on the subset where xi = zi, the hitting
times for the vector process to reach S and for the component process to hit
zi coincide. Since τ∗
j ≥ τS by construction, we should also conclude that:
{x
i
τS = zi} ⊂ {τi ≤ τ
∗
j }
Agent i should then use τi (which coincides with τS on this set).
On the other hand,
x
i




τS >z j ⇒ τ∗
j = τS)
⇒ τi > τ
∗
j
So, we are in the complementary set, in which is sensible to use inf{t>τ∗
j :
xi
t >z i} =i n f {t>τS : xi
t >z i}.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Step 1:( ( τ∗
i )i∈I is an equilibrium) The proof basically reproduces the pre-
vious proposition.
Step 2: (Uniqueness) Suppose there is another equilibrium proﬁle (ν∗
i )i∈I.
Let θ(ω) ≡ ν∗
1(ω)∧ν∗
2(ω). Uniqueness is proved if we establish that (x1
θ,x 2
θ) ∈
z1 × [0,z2] ∪ [0,z1] ∪ z2.
35First one should notice that optimality requires xi
ν∗
i ≥ zi. This in turn
means that xi
θ <z i ⇒ ν∗
i > θ = ν∗
j and consequently x
j
θ = zj.O t h e r w i s e ,
agent j would be stopping early and would do better by delaying this decision.
Can both agents stop simultaneously when xi ∈ (zi,zi)a n dxj ∈ (zj,zj)?
It is optimal for an agent i to stop when xi ∈ (zi,zi)i fb ys t o p p i n gh eo r
she elicits a similar decision by the other player. This happens only when
xj >z j. Although in equilibrium such information is endogenously gener-
ated, for an arbitrary stopping time ν, there is not enough information at ν
for i to tell whether j is below or above the lower threshold. In other words,
σ(xj
ν) * Fi




ρ = 1). But such information (about the opposing agent’s latent utility lo-
cation) is necessary to avoid stopping when the other agent’s state variable
is below the lower threshold. Thus they cannot stop simultaneously at this
region and this should be enough to complete the proof.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
The proof is by induction. For n = 1, Proposition 1 establishes the result.
For a generic n, assume that the statement holds for n − 1. The same




where logxt = αt+σWt and τ denotes the optimal stopping time associated
with this process. So, we can do no better than to use τ on the set {τ ≤ ν1}.
On the complementary set, {τ ≥ ν1}, think of the process logyt =l o gxν+t,t∈
R+. Using the Strong Markov Property, it is seen that the process starts
“afresh” at ν with initial value given by xν and obeying the stochastic pro-
cess with n − 1 drift breaks. The induction argument takes care of this
situation and we achieve the result desired.
36¥
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We divide the proof in three steps:
Step 1: (Stopping times are an increasing sequence) Notice that, by def-
inition, τ0 ≤ τ1 ≤ ···≤ τI and consequently form an increasing sequence of
stopping times.
Step 2: (At each stage at least one agent stops) ∀k ∈ I,∃j : τ∗
j = τk.
Take a stopping time τk. There are two possibilities, represented by two
disjoint subsets of Ω,s a yΩ1 and Ω2:
1. Ω1. The vector process Ak−1xt hits Ak−1ΨI+1−10Ak−11 where (∃i ∈ I :
xi ≥ zi
m and ∀j 6= i,xj ≤ z
j
m−1). In this case, τ∗
i (ω)=τk(ω)( p r o v i d e d
i hasn’t stopped yet), ∀ω ∈ Ω1.




j hasn’t stopped yet). Also in this case it can be seen that τk+1 = τk.
But then, xj
τk = xj
τk+1 ≥ zk+1 a n dt h i si m p l i e st h a tτ∗
j (ω)=τk+1(ω)=
τk(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω2.
This means that, at each stopping time τk,t h ed r i f to fxi drops by ∆αi.
Step 3: Apply Proposition 3.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Let S = {x ∈ RI
+ : ∃i such that xi ≥ zi
1 = z(αi,σi,Ci,γi)} and τS =i n f {t>
0:xt ∈ S} 9. Since the sample paths are continuous P-almost surely, by
9S w o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt oS1 in the I-agent setup of the desertion game.
37Theorem 2.6.5 in Port and Stone [33] the distribution of xτS will be concen-
trated on ∂S. Also,, it is easily seen that P(τS < ∞)=1 .
(Suﬃciency) If there are endogenous eﬀects, zi
1 = z(αi,σi,Ci,γi) >z i
2 =




2,i∈ I. This has positive probability as long as zi
1 >z i
2,i∈ I.
In order to see this, ﬁrst notice that the latent utilities process can be repre-












where Bt is an I-dimensional Brownian motion (with independent compo-
nents) and σI×I =[ σij]. Let ∂S1 = {x ∈ ∂S : zi
1 ≥ xi ≥ zi
2}.B y
Corollary II.2.11.2 in Gihman and Skorohod [16] (p.308), one gets that
P(xτS ∈ ∂S1)=u(x)i sa nA-harmonic function in Sc.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
Au(x)=0i nSc
u(x)=1i fx ∈ ∂S1




















is the inﬁnitesimal generator associated with the above diﬀusion. By the
Minimum Principle for elliptic operators (see Proposition 4.1.3 in Port and
Stone [33] or Section 6.4 in Evans [11]), if u attains a minimum (which in
this case would be zero) on Sc,i ti sc o n s t a n to nSc. This would in turn imply
that ∀x ∈ Sc,u(x)=P[xτS ∈ ∂S1|x0 = x] = 0. But by Proposition 2.3.6 in
Port and Stone [33], one can deduce that u(x)=P[xτS ∈ ∂S1|x0 = x] 6=0 .
(Necessity) If there are no endogenous eﬀects, one agent’s drift is never
aﬀected by the exit of other agents. Each agent’s decision is given by
τ∗
i =i n f {t ∈ R+ : xi
t >z i = z(αi,σi,Ci,γi)}. There will be clustering
38only if τ∗
i = τ∗
j ,i6= j. The state-variable vector can be represented as above
until the killing time τS. Then, there will be clustering only if xt hits S at the
point (zi)i∈I.B u ti nI ≥ 2 dimensions any one-point set A is polar with re-
spect to a Brownian motion, i.e., P[τA < ∞]=0w h e r eτA is the hitting time
for A (Proposition 2.2.5 in Port and Stone [33]). So, P[τ∗
i = τ∗
j ,i6= j]=0 .
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
In preparation.
¥
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Notice that (for t ∈ [0,τS]) the vector process with the latent utilities can be











Denote by A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)t h ei n ﬁnitesimal generator associated with the
above diﬀusion (where the argument reminds the reader of the dependence





























for f in the appropriate domain (see Karatzas and Shreve [23], p.281).
Let G(t,x) be the probability that the diﬀusion will reach S(α)a f t e rt.I n
other words, G(t,x)=P[τS >t |x0 = x] and represents the survival function
for the exit time distribution of the ﬁrst deserter. Following Gardiner [14],
39Subsection 5.4.2, this probability can be conveniently written as the solu-
tion to the following (parabolic) partial diﬀerential equation (Kolmogorov
backward equation):
Gt = A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)G in Sc((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C),t>0
G(0,x)=1 ,x ∈ Sc((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C)
G(t,x)=0 ,x ∈ S((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C)a n dt ≥ 0
where the initial value condition holds since G(0,x)=P[τS < ∞|x0 =
x]=1 ,∀x ∈ Sc((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C) and the boundary condition follows since
∂S((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C) ⊂ S((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C) and because 0 is an absorbing bound-
ary for xi,i∈ I.
Uniqueness is obtained in Theorem 4, Section 7.1.2 in Evans [11].
¥
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The proof follows the same techniques as above (see Gardiner [14], Section
5.4.2). The (parabolic) partial diﬀerential equation is now subject to the
following initial value condition:
H(0,x)=P[xτS ∈ ∂S1|x0 = x]=u(x)
and u follows the following (elliptic) diﬀerential equation by Corollary II.2.11.2
in Gihman and Skorohod [16] (p.308):
A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)u =0i nSc((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C)
u(x)=1 ,x ∈ ∂S1
u(x)=0 ,x ∈ ∂S\∂S1.
¥
For the next theorem we will make use of the following result (Theorem 1 in
Ara´ ujo and Mas-Colell [2]), which we cite as a lemma.
40Lemma 1 Let Ψ be a topological space, E ⊂ Rn,1 ≤ n ≤∞and ν denote a
Borel probability measure on Rn. Assume the following:
1. (Ψ × Ψ)\∆ is a Lindel¨ of space (i.e. any open cover has a countable
subcover), where ∆ = {(x,y) ∈ Ψ × Ψ : x = y}.
2. F : Ψ × E → R is a continuous function.
3. ∀i,ψ ∈ Ψ and a ∈ E,∂aiF(ψ,a) exists and depends continuously on x
and a.
4. ν is a product probability measure, each factor being absolutely contin-
uous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
5. (Sondermann Condition) If F(ψ,a)=F(ˆ ψ,a),ψ 6= ˆ ψ,t h e n∂ai(F(ψ,a)−
F(ˆ ψ,a)) 6=0for some i.
Then, for ν-a.e. a ∈ E,t h ef u n c t i o nF(·,a):Ψ → R has at most one
maximizer.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
Step 1: Consider the expected log-likelihood function conditioned on w:
Z
log[g(t; ˆ ψ,w)]g(t;ψ,w)dt
From the properties of the Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative entropy for
two probability distributions, it is obtained that ˆ ψ is maximizes the expected
log-likelihood if and only if g(t; ˆ ψ,w)=g(t;ψ,w). In particular, ˆ ψ = ψ is
one such maximizer.
Step 2:T a k eΨ = {ψ, ˆ ψ}. By Lemma 1, there is at most one maximizer
for the expected log-likelihood function Fw-a.e. and we know that ψ is max-
imizes it.
¥
41P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3
Take two (potentially diﬀerent) parameter vectors ψ =( ( αi)i∈I,∆α,ρ,σ,γ,C)
and ˆ ψ =( ( ˆ αi)i∈I,d ∆α, ˆ ρ, ˆ σ,ˆ γ, ˆ C). Consider x ∈ int[supp(F0)]. We are inter-
ested in showing that
P[(τ
∗
i )i∈I ∈ A|x0 = x;ψ]
(where A ∈ B(RI
+)) diﬀers for any such x unless these two parameter vectors
are identical. A few things are noteworthy before we proceed. First, the
threshold zi = z(ψ)=z(αi,σ,γ,C),i∈ I depends on α,σ,γ and C, but not
on (∆α,ρ). Also, at least one player will quit at τS1 =i n f {t>0:xt ∈ S1}
(i.e., τS1 = ∧i∈Iτ∗
i ). Remark also that the event “at least one player leaves”,
which occurs at the hitting time τS1,i sn o ta ﬀected by ∆α, but is neverthe-
less inﬂuenced by ρ.
We sequentially identify the parameters and thus break the proof into three
steps:
Step 1:( ( αi)i∈I,ρ,σ). As in previous propositions, the vector process with
the latent utilities can be represented as the following diﬀusion process with








































for f in the appropriate domain (see Karatzas and Shreve [23], p.281).
Letting G(t;x,ψ)=P[τS1 >t |x0 = x,ψ], one obtains that for x ∈ b S1 ∩










i)i∈I, ˆ ρ, ˆ σ)G(t;x, ˆ ψ).





i)i∈I,ρ,σ)h(t;x,ψ, ˆ ψ)+g(t;x,ψ, ˆ ψ)
where g(t;x,ψ, ˆ ψ)=[ A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ) − A((ˆ αi)i∈I, ˆ ρ, ˆ σ)]G(t;x, ˆ ψ).
If we assume that, for x ∈ b S1 ∩ S1 ∩ int[supp(F0)],
G(t;x,ψ)=G(t;x, ˆ ψ), ∀t>0.













i)i∈I,ρ,σ)[G(t;x,ψ) − G(t;x, ˆ ψ)] = 0,
∀t>0. This in turn implies that g(t;x,ψ, ˆ ψ) = 0 or, in other words,
[A((α
i)i∈I,ρ,σ) − A((ˆ α
i)i∈I, ˆ ρ, ˆ σ)]G(t;x, ˆ ψ)=0 .
Since (having ﬁxed t) G(t;·, ˆ ψ) is not constant, one must have
A((α
i)i∈I,ρ,σ) − A((ˆ α
i)i∈I, ˆ ρ, ˆ σ)=0 .
This means that ((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)=( (ˆ αi)i∈I, ˆ ρ, ˆ σ).
43Step 2:( ∆α). Assume then that (αi)i∈I =( ˆ αi)i∈I,ρ =ˆ ρ and σ =ˆ σ and











+2 γ/σ2 > 1.
Since (αi)i∈I =(ˆ αi)i∈I,ρ =ˆ ρ and σ =ˆ σ,w em u s th a v et h a t
z(α
i,σ,C,γ)=z(α
i,σ, ˆ C,ˆ γ),i ∈ I.
If this were not the case, one would have either
z(α
i,σ,C,γ) >z (α




i,σ, ˆ C,ˆ γ),i ∈ I.
and, consequently, either
S1((α
i)i∈I,σ,γ,C) ≡ S1 ⊂ ˆ S1 ≡ S1((ˆ α
i)i∈I, ˆ σ, ˆ γ, ˆ C)
or
S1((α
i)i∈I,σ,γ,C) ≡ S1 ⊃ ˆ S1 ≡ S1((ˆ α
i)i∈I, ˆ σ, ˆ γ, ˆ C).
Considering that the inﬁnitesimal generators for the latent utility process co-
incide (being given by A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ)) we would have G(·,x;ψ) 6= G(·,x;(ˆ ψ)
(since then either τS1 < τˆ S1 or τS1 > τˆ S1,P-a.s.).
Taking then into account that S1 = ˆ S1 (and τS1 = τˆ S1,P-a.s.), it should









,σ, ˆ C,ˆ γ),i ∈ I.
44If this were not true, one could show similarly that either
∂SH((α
i)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α) ≡ ∂SH ⊂ d ∂SH ≡ ∂SH((ˆ α
i)i∈I, ˆ σ, ˆ γ, ˆ C,d ∆α)
or
∂SH((α
i)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α) ≡ ∂SH ⊃ d ∂SH ≡ ∂SH((ˆ α
i)i∈I, ˆ σ, ˆ γ, ˆ C,d ∆α)
where ∂SH((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α)i sd e ﬁned in Proposition 9. This will then
imply that the probability of simultaneous exits will be larger in one para-
metric conﬁguration than in other.
Deﬁne yi
t =˜ xi
τS1+t =l o g xi
τS1+t and ˜ Wi
t = Wi









0 =l o gx
i
τS1, ∀i ∈ I
provided xτS1 / ∈ ∂SH (i.e., there are no simultaneous exits in the ﬁrst deser-
tion round). But then one can apply the results in Step 1 for the identiﬁability
of the drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients to obtain that, unless ∆α = d ∆α,t h e
probability distribution for the timing of the second round of desertions given
that there was no clustering in the ﬁrst round of desertions will diﬀer for the
two parameters.
Step 3:( C,γ). Notice that, as opposed to the previous set of parameters,
C and γ only aﬀect the thresholds z(α,σ,C,γ) but do not interfere with the
probability law governing the latent utilities process. With more than two
agents it is then easy to see that for a given pair C,γ, the parameters ˆ C,ˆ γ
would have to satisfy the set of equations
z(α
i − k∆α/(I − 1),σ,C,γ)=z(α
i − k∆α/(I − 1),σ, ˆ C,ˆ γ)











+2 γ/σ2 > 1.
I ft h ea b o v es y s t e mo fe q u a t i o n sh o l dw eh a v et h a t
h(α,k∆α,σ,γ, ˆ γ) ≡
β(α − k∆α/(I − 1),σ,γ)
β(α − k∆α/(I − 1),σ,γ) − 1
×
×
β(α − k∆α/(I − 1),σ,ˆ γ) − 1




,k =0 ,...,I− 1 ∀i ∈ I.
Given that I>2 this relation is impossible since h can be checked not to
be homogeneous of degree zero with respect to the argument ∆α.T h i s i n
turn implies that not all the thresholds can coincide, which means that the
probability distribution over exit times will change if one modiﬁes C or γ.
¥
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